When copying a model's behavior with a tool, children tend to imitate (copy the specific actions to replicate the model's goal) rather than emulate (bring about the model's goal in the most efficient way). Tasks producing these findings test children immediately after the behavior is modeled. In 2 experiments, we investigated children's copying behavior after a delay (of a week). In Experiment 1 (n ϭ 90), we found that although 3-and 4-year-olds often imitate in the short term, they are more likely to emulate in the long term. Data from Experiment 2 (n ϭ 80) were consistent with children remembering actions that were relevant to a causal narrative of the task. Overall, our data suggest that children simultaneously encode modeled behavior in 2 ways that lead to both imitation and emulation. In the discussion, we consider what kind of information leads children to emulate in the long term.
Comparative psychologists have found many informative similarities and differences between human and chimpanzee behavior. One difference concerns observational learning, in which knowledge is acquired by watching a model and then copying that behavior. When learning about tools, children tend to imitate Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007; McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007; Nagell, Olgin, & Tomasello, 1993; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2006; Whiten, Custance, Gomez, Teixidor, & Bard, 1996) , whereas chimpanzees emulate Horner & Whiten, 2005; MyowaYamakoshi & Matsuzawa, 2000; Nagell et al., 1993; Tennie et al., 2006; Tomasello, Davis-Dasilva, Camak, & Bard, 1987) . Imitation involves replicating the specific actions performed by the model to produce the model's goal (Whiten & Ham, 1992) . In contrast, emulation involves bringing about the model's goal (or physical outcome) by the most efficient means possible (Tomasello, 1990) . 1 Horner and Whiten (2005) observed this difference between children and chimpanzees with a puzzle box task. In the clear condition, a transparent box had an aperture in one side that led to a passage containing a reward and an aperture on the top that led nowhere. In the task, the experimenter made an irrelevant followed by a relevant action. The experimenter first inserted a tool through the top aperture to no effect (the irrelevant action) and then through the front aperture to retrieve the reward (the relevant action). As the box was transparent, participants could see that during the first action, the tool made no contact with the reward, and they could therefore infer that this action was not needed to retrieve the reward.
In this clear condition, 4-year-olds tended to perform both the irrelevant and the relevant actions, meaning that they were imitating: replicating the modeled actions rather than only producing behavior needed for reward retrieval (the outcome or goal). In contrast, chimpanzees tended to perform only the relevant action, meaning that they were emulating: replicating reward retrieval without copying all the modeled actions. Crucially, in an opaque condition, in which chimpanzees could not see that the irrelevant action was unnecessary, they tended to perform both actions. This suggests that knowing the irrelevance of the first action led chimpanzees to ignore it in the clear condition.
This surprising finding-that children imitate when the smart thing to do is to emulate-has encouraged some to suggest that children "overimitate" (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 2007; Whiten et al., 1996) . We define overimitation as copying the specific actions made by a model, despite them being unnecessary to achieve or an inefficient way of replicating the model's goal. Recently, both physical and social explanations have been proposed to explain why children overimitate. Children may overimitate in the puzzle box and similar tasks because their poor physical understanding means that they do not realize that the irrelevant action is unnecessary (Lyons et al., 2007) . Alternatively, children's overimitation may be social: Children attempt to promote affiliation with a model by exactly copying the model's actions (Carpenter, 2006; Meltzoff, 2007; Nielsen, 2006) .
A further puzzle arising from the developmental literature is that although children overimitate, infants often do not (e.g., Brugger, Larivierre, Mumme, & Bushnell, 2007; Nielsen, 2006; Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010; Williamson, Meltzoff, & Markman, 2008) . Infant copying behavior seems to be influenced by the physical and social cues provided by the model, either before or during the demonstration (e.g., Brugger et al., 2007; Carpenter et al., 2005; Nielsen, 2006; Southgate et al., 2010; Williamson et al., 2008) . Several theories have been proposed to explain infants' copying behavior and all are based on the assumption that infants reflect on the intentions of and their relationship to the model (Carpenter, 2006; Gergely & Csibra, 2006; Gattis, Bekkering, & Wohlschläger, 2002; Meltzoff, 2007; Nielsen, 2006; Uzgiris, 1981) .
Taken together, what emerges is a trend toward overimitation that increases with age (McGuigan & Whiten, 2009) , which has been reinforced by the recent observation that adults may overimitate most of all (McGuigan et al., 2011) . We suggest that three factors may influence this developmental trend.
1. Older children may focus more on social affiliation than younger children do and aim to achieve this through precise imitation (Nielsen, 2006; Uzgiris, 1981) .
2. Following Bauer and Kleinknecht (2002) , task complexity may be a factor. Older children are usually tested on more complex tasks than younger children are, and such tasks may encourage overimitation as a conservative strategy that guarantees success in conditions of uncertainty (for related claims, see Whiten, 1996; Williamson & Markman, 2006) .
3. Older children may simply remember more than younger children do (for a review of the development of memory for action sequences, see Bauer, Wenner, Dropik, & Wewerka, 2000) , and this will increase their capacity for overimitation (without explaining why they do it).
In this study, we sought to investigate the conditions under which children overimitate. Specifically, we investigated children's ability to form long-term, as well as short-term, memories of the two actions modeled in the puzzle box task. Our reasoning was simple. Children, when tested immediately after a demonstration, would find it easy to produce the two actions: They would overimitate. However, if there was a delay between the model demonstrating the actions and children having the opportunity to copy them, then memory of the irrelevant action (which is, by definition, less meaningful) may fade, leading them to emulate. We tested this hypothesis with two experiments. Overall, our data were consistent with the hypothesis. Children tested immediately tended to imitate, whereas those tested after a delay tended to emulate. Thus, our data suggest that children do not always overimitate. In the General Discussion section, we consider what children might be remembering about the puzzle box demonstration.
Experiment 1
We compared children's puzzle box performance in short-and long-term conditions. Three-and 4-year-olds watched the irrelevant and relevant actions modeled on a puzzle box. A third of the participants were immediately given a turn (short-term condition), and a third were tested after a delay of 1 week (long-term condition). A final third were simply shown the box and asked to play with it (control condition). By comparing children's performance on the long-term and control conditions, we could determine how observing the model affected their learning about the puzzle box.
Method
Design. A between-participants design was used with testing interval as the independent variable (short-term, long-term, control). The dependent variables were frequency of making the irrelevant and relevant actions and frequency of imitation and emulation.
Participants. Ninety children took part in the experiment: 45 girls and 45 boys. The children were between 3 years 0 months and 4 years 11 months in age, with a mean age of 3 years 10 months. All of the children attended nurseries or a reception class in an inner city borough of London, England.
Materials. We used a simplified version of Horner and Whiten's (2005) puzzle box (see Figure 1 ) to make the task easier for the children to understand and remember. The clear polycarbonate cube had two apertures, one at the front and one on the top. The front aperture opened into a passage that contained a block. This block could be removed by inserting an L-shaped tool.
Procedure. The two experimenters and child sat side by side at a small table. One experimenter said, "Watch what I'm doing," and demonstrated removing a block from the apparatus, performing both the irrelevant and the relevant actions. This demonstration was presented three times (with children being asked to look away while a new block was inserted in the box). In the test phase of the short-term condition, the experimenter then said, "It's your turn." Both experimenters coded the children's actions. The test trial lasted until the block was removed. Each child received three test trials, with a new block being inserted in the box for each trial.
In the long-term condition, after the demonstrations were completed, the experimenter said, "You'll have a turn tomorrow" (to indicate that the child would be tested in the future). The test phase took place five to eight days later. As in the short-term condition, the experimenter simply said, "It's your turn," and the child received three test trials. In the control condition, the child watched as the box and the tool were placed on the table. The child was told, "Some children have been playing with these, now it's your turn." In both the long-term and the control conditions, children were allowed to interact with the apparatus for up to 30 s or until the block was removed. If children asked what to do, the experimenter said, "Whatever you like." Figure 1 . The puzzle box. This is a simplified version of Horner and Whiten's (2005) original apparatus.
Results
We coded children's performance in two ways. We coded whether their actions were relevant or irrelevant, to help us understand what information was stored in the short-and long-term representations. We also coded whether their actions were instances of imitation or emulation. Performance was coded as imitation only if they performed the irrelevant action first followed by the relevant action and as emulation if they performed only the relevant action. For both types of coding, we only analyzed (up to) the first two actions made. Interrater reliability in coding children's actions was consistently high ( Ͼ .78 in all cases). There were no significant effects of age, gender, or trial.
Actions. The frequency of irrelevant and relevant actions are summarized in Figure 2 . In the short-term condition, children always made the relevant action and frequently made the irrelevant action too (.67). In the long-term condition, production of the relevant condition was maintained (.93), but the irrelevant action was made less frequently (.23). Both the relevant (.23) and the irrelevant actions (.27) were made infrequently in the control condition.
Binary logistic regression was used to address two questions: (a) Was an action made more often in the short-term condition than the long-term condition? (b) Was an action made more often in the long-term condition than the control condition? For the irrelevant action, this analysis showed that children made this response significantly more often in the short-term condition than the longterm condition (odds ratio ϭ 11.7, p Ͻ .001, 95% confidence interval [CI; 3.38, 40.22] ) but that the control and long-term conditions did not differ (odds ratio ϭ 1.82, p ϭ .351). For the relevant action, the short-and long-term conditions could not be analyzed because there was no variance in the former condition.
Comparison of the long-term and control conditions showed that children made the relevant action considerably more often in the long-term condition (odds ratio ϭ 46.0, p Ͻ .001, 95% CI [8.69, 243.25] ).
Type of copying. The frequency of imitation and emulation is summarized in Figure 2 . Children imitated more often in the short-term condition (.65 imitation, .33 emulation) but emulated more in the long-term condition (.21 imitation, .58 emulation). Children rarely emulated (.17) and never imitated in the control condition.
Looking at imitation copying, we found that the long-term and control conditions could not be compared because in the control condition, no children imitated (i.e., made the irrelevant action followed by the relevant action). A logistic regression model showed that children imitated more often in the short-term than the long-term condition (odds ratio ϭ 32.7, p Ͻ .001, 95% CI [9.08, 117.51]). When looking at emulation copying, logistic regression showed that children emulated more often in the long-term condition than the short-term condition (odds ratio ϭ 4.03, p ϭ .011, 95% CI [1.37, 11.90]) and emulated more often in the long-term condition than the control condition (odds ratio ϭ 8.62, p Ͻ .001, 95% CI [2.56, 29.41]).
Discussion
The difference between children's behavior in the short-term and long-term conditions was striking. Children performed the relevant action as often after one week as they did immediately following the demonstration, but their production of the irrelevant action declined substantially. As a consequence, the majority of children imitated in the short-term condition but emulated in the long-term condition. In comparison to children in the control condition (with no modeled behavior), children in the long-term condition performed the relevant action, but not the irrelevant action, much more frequently. Thus, when children saw the relevant action modeled, it had a dramatic effect on its production in the long-term.
On the basis of these data, one might be tempted to conclude that in the long-term condition, children's production of the relevant action implies better memory for information associated with the causal narrative of the model's behavior (e.g., children remember the relevant action because it is associated with the model's goal). However, there was a confounding variable: action order. The irrelevant action was always made first and the relevant action second. Children may have produced the relevant action more often because it came second. Maybe there was a recency effect, with children remembering the more recent action better in the long term. Such a proposal is unlikely given the robust finding from decades of memory research that in long-term recall, participants show only a primacy effect (remembering items better from the start of a sequence; e.g., Craik, 1971; Glanzer & Cunitz, 1966 ; Figure 2 . Performance in Experiment 1 in the short-term, long-term and control conditions. A: Type of action (gray square ϭ relevant, gray triangle ϭ irrelevant). B: Type of copying (white square ϭ emulation, white triangle ϭ imitation). Postman & Phillips, 1965) . Nevertheless, we could not discount the possibility of a recency effect in Experiment 1. In the second experiment, we sought to clarify why children performed the relevant action so often in the long-term condition.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we investigated how two factors-action order and test interval-affected children's copying behavior. In the standard condition, the model performed the irrelevant action followed by the relevant action. In the reverse condition, the relevant action came first and was followed by the irrelevant action. Children's copying behavior was tested immediately or after a delay as before, to produce four conditions in all: standard short-term, standard long-term, reverse short-term, and reverse long-term.
This experiment had two aims. In the reverse long-term condition, if children remembered the relevant action better than the irrelevant action, then after a delay, they would produce the relevant action more often. If, however, children remembered the second action better than the first action, then they would produce the irrelevant action more often. Second, we were also interested in children's copying behavior in the reverse short-term condition. Reversing the order of the two actions emphasized that the irrelevant action was not needed to achieve the goal, because the irrelevant action followed the retrieval of the block. In these circumstances, we wondered whether children would still imitate (perform both actions) in the short-term condition. If they did, it would imply that children imitate even when the physical context spotlights that the irrelevant action is unnecessary, suggesting that it is not uncertainty about the necessity of the irrelevant action that encourages children to imitate in the puzzle box task.
Method
Design. A between-participants design was used, with testing interval (short-term, long-term) and action order (standard, reverse) as the independent variables. The dependent variables were frequency of making the irrelevant and relevant actions and frequency of imitation and emulation.
Participants. Eighty children took part in the experiment: 43 girls and 37 boys. The children were between 3 years 0 months and 4 years 11 months of age with a mean age of 4 years 0 months. All of the children attended nurseries or a reception class in an inner city borough of London, England.
Materials.
The materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1.
Procedure.
The procedure was the same as that used in Experiment 1, except that only data from one test trial were collected and, in the reverse conditions, the relevant action was modeled before the irrelevant action.
Results
Actions. The frequency of irrelevant and relevant actions is summarized in Figure 3 . Performance on the standard and reverse conditions was similar. The majority of children made the irrelevant action in the short-term condition (.75 overall), but this declined in the long-term condition (.30 overall). In contrast, the majority of children made the relevant action in all conditions (.80 -1.00).
Logistic regression was used to analyze the effect of the testing interval (short term, long-term) and action order (standard, reverse) and the interaction between them. For the irrelevant action, there was an effect of test interval (odds ratio ϭ 9.00, p ϭ .003, 95% CI [2.15, 37.75]) but no effect of action order (odds ratio ϭ 1.62, p ϭ .492) or interaction (odds ratio ϭ 0.619, p ϭ .635). For the relevant actions, there were no main effects (for the test interval, odds ratio ϭ 3.90, p ϭ .118; for the action order, odds ratio ϭ 3.90, p ϭ .118), and the interaction could not be calculated because there was no variance in the standard short-term condition.
Type of copying. The frequency of imitation and emulation is summarized in Figure 3 . Performance in the standard and reverse conditions was similar. Children imitated more often in the short-term condition (.73 imitation, .28 emulation) but emulated more in the long-term condition (.18 imitation, .55 emulation).
Logistic regression was again used to analyze the effect of testing interval and action order and the interaction between them. For imitation, there was an effect of testing interval (odds ratio ϭ 13.04, p Ͻ .001, 95% CI [4.37, 38 .88]) but no effect of action order (odds ratio ϭ 1.80, p ϭ .284) or interaction (odds ratio ϭ 0.429, p ϭ .462). Likewise for emulation, there was an effect of testing interval (odds ratio ϭ 3.62, p ϭ .007, 95% CI [1.41, 9.26]) but no effect of action order (odds ratio ϭ 1.57, p ϭ .616) or interaction (odds ratio ϭ 1.76, p ϭ .262). 
Discussion
In the reverse long-term condition, children produced the relevant action more often than the irrelevant action. This supports the proposal that, when tested after a delay, children produce the relevant action because of its role in the causal narrative and not because of its position in the action sequence.
In the reverse short-term condition, children made the irrelevant action, even though they were performing it having already brought about the model's goal. It seems highly unlikely that children thought it necessary to make an action to achieve a goal that they had already satisfied (one cannot change the past). Thus children's behavior in the reverse short-term condition is a striking example of overimitation. This finding suggests that, when tested immediately, children copy actions even when they know them to be unnecessary.
General Discussion
In two experiments, children saw a model perform two actions on a box with a hole in the front and one in the top. The relevant action made through the front hole was necessary to achieve the model's inferable goal (removing a block from the box); the irrelevant action made through the top hole was not. We found that children tended to imitate (make both actions) if tested immediately after the model's demonstration, but they tended to emulate (make only the relevant action) if tested after a week. Changing the order in which the actions were modeled did not affect children's performance, suggesting that it was the relevance of the action, rather than its position in the action sequence, that determined whether it was made after a delay. What conclusions can be drawn from these data?
First, children do overimitate in the puzzle box task, but not always. We replicated previous findings (e.g., Horner & Whiten, 2005) , with imitation being more common than emulation in the short-term condition. Even with exactly the same demonstration, simply bringing children back a week later reversed this pattern, with emulation being the predominant form of copying. Second, children form two kinds of representation in our puzzle box task (see Bauer & Kleinknecht, 2002 , for a similar analysis of the copying behavior of at least some 20-month-olds). Whatever the content of these representations-and irrespective of how, when, and why they are formed and how long they last-the two types of copying behaviors that we observed can only be explained if two kinds of representations are formed. Before turning to the question of what the content of these representations might be, we briefly consider why children overimitate in the short-term condition.
As we outlined in the introduction, two recent accounts have been proposed to explain overimitation. The physical account suggests that children overimitate because they are unsure which actions are needed to bring about the model's goal (Lyons et al., 2007; Williamson & Markman, 2006) ; the social account suggests that children overimitate to promote social affiliation (Carpenter, 2006; Meltzoff, 2007; Nielsen, 2006; Uzgiris, 1981) . Nothing in our data suggests that children were unsure whether the irrelevant action was needed to retrieve the block from the box. In the long-term conditions, children produced the relevant action far more often than they produced the irrelevant action, which is consistent with them realizing from the outset that this action was special (see Bauer et al., 2000 , for a similar interpretation). Furthermore, in the reverse short-term condition, children still made the irrelevant action, even though they were performing this action after replicating the model's goal. Thus, it would appear that children were copying an action that they knew to be unnecessary, and this poses a problem for the physical account. Our data do not pose a problem for the social account: Unnecessary actions, like necessary ones, are just as likely to be performed to promote social affiliation. However, recent puzzle box data do challenge the social account (McGuigan et al., 2011) , and the question of why people overimitate remains open.
In a current review of theories that aim to explain copying behavior, Heyes and Bird (2007) usefully distinguished between theories that are underpinned by sensorimotor representations and those that are underpinned by conceptual representations. In sensorimotor theories, sensory representations are directly linked to motor representations, whereas, in conceptual theories, a highlevel representation intervenes between these representations. Sensorimotor models-for example, associative sequence learning (Heyes & Ray, 2000) and Hebbian learning (Keysers & Perrett's, 2004) -suggest that people have a tendency to copy all actions. Hence, these models are more compatible with imitation copying. Making a sensorimotor representation allows the encoding of actions that cannot be labeled conceptually because they are meaningless (e.g., an irrelevant action that achieves nothing). In contrast, conceptual models such as active intermodal mapping (AIM; Meltzoff, 2002) and goal-directed imitation (GOADI; Gattis et al., 2002) suggest that high-level representations lead people to copy the goals of a model. Conceptual models are therefore more compatible with emulation copying. It is only through additional conceptual labeling that a stream of actions can be differentiated and some selected as worth copying (e.g., the relevant action is selected because it achieves the model's goal).
On the basis of Heyes and Bird's (2007) taxonomy, we propose that performance in our short-term condition uses a sensorimotor representation and performance in our long-term condition uses a conceptual representation. Thus, our data imply that when children watch modeled behavior, they simultaneously form two kinds of representation. The simplest way to interpret our data is to suggest that (a) both representations are present in the short-term (with children selecting the sensorimotor representation and thus imitating) and (b) the sensorimotor representation fades in the long-term, leaving only the conceptual representation (leading children to emulate). Of course, other interpretations are possible.
We return now to the question of the content of the representation that leads children to emulate in the long-term. We start with stimulus enhancement, which proposes that apparent copying behavior results from children's increased attention to the parts of an apparatus on which the model acts (e.g., for a discussion of this issue, see Huang, Heyes, & Charman, 2006) . For example, the puzzle box demonstration could have simply encouraged children to use the L-shaped tool. We suggest that our data speak against this proposal. In the long-term condition, the relevant action was produced about 50 times more often than it was in the control condition. If, through stimulus enhancement, children were encouraged to interact with the tool, it seems very unlikely that this encouragement would lead to almost all of them making the relevant action (and more than half of them to make only the relevant action). Whatever was encoded in the long-term repre-sentation, it had a dramatic effect on the production of the relevant action and only this action.
What else could children be remembering? There are an impressive number of options. One is that when children observe the experimenter act on the puzzle box, they learn the physical outcome associated with the box (the block is removed from the box). A second option, consistent with models like AIM (Meltzoff, 2002) and GOADI (Gattis et al., 2002) , is that having observed the outcome, children infer and store the model's goal (the model wanted to remove the block from the box). A third option, consistent with research suggesting that children place particular significance on a tool's function (e.g., Hernik & Csibra, 2009; Nelson, Egan, & Holt, 2004) , is that they infer and remember the function of the novel tool used in task (the L-shaped tool retrieves the block). It is worth noting that with all of these options, children still need to infer the relevant action to produce it in the long-term condition. This brings us to the final option: Children remember the relevant action itself, and this is why they produce it so often in the long-term condition.
If children remember the relevant (and forget the irrelevant) action, then what property identifies the relevant action as worth remembering? Children may remember this action because they are aware of its role in the causal narrative of the task. For example, this action brings about the physical outcome, achieves the goal of the model, and highlights the function of the tool used in the task.
Conclusion
Children do not always overimitate. Our data suggest that when watching a model act, children form two types of representationone sensorimotor and the other conceptual. The sensorimotor representation is used in the short-term and the conceptual representation in the long-term. Future research should determine the content of these representations and which cognitive and social factors determine when they are used. Many different types of information could be laid down in the conceptual representation, and its precise contents may reflect the context in which learning occurs (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Gergely & Csibra, 2006) . This, in turn, will tell us what children learn from observational learning.
